Simplicity in most theoretical contexts is regarded as a virtue. Consequently, many scientists and philosophers are doubly attracted to proposals for the unification of science; doubly attracted because the success of such proposals will not only simplify particular theories, but the whole of science as well.
Apparently, the sort of explanation to be given for why T2 operates with the entities it does is that these entities are identical with the (configurations of) entities discussed in T1. Thus the complete explanation of T2 (it should be emphasized that Causey is not satisfied merely with its derivation from T1) depends in an even stronger sense on the certification of the relevant synthetic identities. Their importance in the present discussion is not in virtue of their logical character as connecting principles but rather in virtue of the empirical claims they make. The homogeneity conditions minimize the practical problems of establishing identities in reduction contexts, since these identities are presupposed in the model.
As noted above, Causey's confidence as to both the possibility and relative frequency of uniform microreductions stands in some contrast to the findings of other researchers. In holding out for uniform microreductions, it seems that Causey has either chosen to ignore some recent analyses of alleged microreductions (e.g., Wimsatt 1976) and opted for an unreasonably restrictive model or that he has declared the problem of distinguishing and establishing identities solved (without disclosing the practical strategies involved in the solution). Since Causey would deny his need to address the first horn, he must surely contend with the second.
Jerry Fodor has made a general point which indicates some of the limitations on the range of intertheoretic relations to which Causey's model can apply. Fodor points out, quite simply, that "not all statements of identities are identities of composition." (Fodor 1968 , p. 112) Causey demands part-whole identities between the natural kinds (and/or specified configurations of natural kinds) of T1 and T2 in order to achieve uniform microreductions, but Fodor offers three related reasons for thinking that it is unlikely that these identities will hold in the reduction of what Fodor calls the "special sciences" to the physical sciences: Fodor's main point is that the special sciences divide up the world to fit their explanatory purposes, and more often than not, these divisions can not be captured by simple statements about the natural kinds of the physical world. For example, functional analyses seem to offer the simplest characterizations of the relations between some psychological and neurological phenomena. At least some psychological states can apparently have a multiplicity of underlying physical realizations, and mentalistic idioms offer an efficient means of capturing their functional equivalence. (See Pattee 1973 and Simon 1973.) Functional analyses, unlike compositional characterizations, are not amenable to uniform microreduction, since they do not specify identities (or correspondences for that matter) between natural kinds. The first payment on the behavioral psychologists'" promissory note is due, but the microreductions they await seem to be plagued with the same conceptual difficulties that their own analyses incur.
Fodor argues that in the reduction of a special science any compositional identities that might hold between the entities of T1 and T2 are, at best, quite complex, but also that in some cases they are succinctly specifiable by functional means only. It is not clear how unwieldy a compositional characterization of possible correspondences must be before it ceases to be informative either theoretically or ontologically. Fodor suggests that they need not be too extensive before most scientists opt for functional talk. (Also, it should perhaps be mentioned at this point that Fodor's account of functional analysis has been attacked as, if anything, oversimplified. Basically, the charge is that he confines his account to the inner workings of the black box. He treats functional systems as if they are completely closed, and consequently, in their specification he ignores the states of the larger systems in which they are imbedded.) For Fodor these points are collectively sufficient to undercut the strong versions of the identity theory and any comprehensive program for the unity of science. Apparently, the strongest thesis the materialist can defend is what Fodor calls "token physicalism", which asserts only that "all the events that the sciences talk about are physical events." (Fodor 1974 , p. 100)3 Presumably, what Fodor means by this is that every event within the explanatory scope of science has a physical description. This thesis vindicates neither attempted microreductions of mentalistic psychology nor Causey's strongest claims for the unity of science by means of uniform microreductions.
The logical import of Causey's plea for synthetic identities as reduction functions is apparent enough, viz., to achieve the microreduction of T2 from T1 exclusively and not from the conjunction of T1 and some additional set of irreducible bridge laws. But whether or not this analysis justifies the ontological economizing Causey ascribes to uniform microreductions is quite another matter.
Causey has advocated the following four theses: (1) identity statements are necessary as the connecting principles in successful microreductions, (2) these identity statements do not require explanation (in the strong sense that they are in principle not subject to causal explanation), but (3) they do require empirical justification (because even though they are noncausal, they are, nevertheless, synthetic statements), and finally (4) "the justification of the identity connecting sentences will be accomplished within the entire framework of a successful reduction." (1977, p. 93) What demands further discussion is exactly how claims about hypothetical identities, necessary for the success of the microreductions that in turn seem to justify them (from (1) and (4)), can guarantee such thoroughgoing ontological simplifications. Of course a satisfactory solution for this difficulty would go a long way toward dispensing with the second horn of the dilemma mentioned above.
First of all, Causey needs to provide some criterion by which identity statements can be distinguished from weaker claims about nomological coextensionalities. In at least one place he claims that (2) is such a criterion. "Suppose that we have empirically justified 'A iff B', where A and B are attributes. Thus 'A iff B' is at least a correlation. I claim that it will be a contingent identity iff it does not require explanation." (1972a, p. 417) So it seems that attribute identities (and derivatively thing identities) are distinguishable from mere nomological coextensionalities, and that the reductions they facilitate contribute the requisite documentation.
There are, however, obvious problems. In light of his practical recommendations that after considerable progress in a science, "eventually there will remain a residual set of connecting sentences which will resist 3Wimsatt (1976) makes a similar claim: "Without type-correspondences, property identifications seem to be ruled out, and about the only kind of identity left is 'stuff' identityroughly, that the stuff with the psychological properties is the same stuff as the stuff with the physical properties. Philosophers, concentrating on ontological dividends, have found this to be uninteresting and trivial." continued efforts at their explanation," and "it will be natural to hypothesize that this residual set is a set of identities In his reply to Ager, et al., Causey (rightly) denies that he advocates the derivation of an identity from a biconditional. What he neither notices nor answers, however, is their larger accusation of which this is but a consequence, viz., that unless he can achieve just such a derivation, his criterion appears to be circular. They summarize the problem (between (1) and (4) above): "If you can join a postulated identity with a reducing theory, you cannot use the reducing theory to support the identity." (Ager, et al. 1974, p. 131) There is something right about this charge. There is also something wrong with it. What is wrong with it is that it misinterprets the aim of Causey's program at this point. In citing their resistance to explanation, Causey is offering a means for distinguishing identities from nomological coextensionalities, not "supporting" them. His proposal is not some criterion by which we can establish the truth of identity claims.
What is right about their charge, however, is that such conceptual distinctions are only as good as the practical strategies they engender, especially when Causey explicitly claims as his ultimate goal just such practical advice. The point is that Causey does owe us a fuller account of how scientists do, in fact, proceed to justify their hypothetical claims about identities.
Causey never seems to think that the identification of entities should be motivated by anything more than their ability to promote ontological economizing. He explicitly states that "the aim of microreduction is to However attractive it may seem, Fodor has argued that the microreduction of psychology is one of those microreductions that is completely "unanticipated otherwise", since among other things the mappings of psychological on to neural structures do not seem to display such uniformities. We have no compelling reasons to think that a hypothesized identity's promises of simplicity, whether theoretical or ontological, are a thoroughly reliable index for the plausibility of a microreduction. Suggestive source, perhaps, guarantor, hardly! Whatever plausibility the proposed microreduction and its accordant hypothesized identities can muster depends in the end upon their explanatory dividends.
Though Fodor is adamant that the microreduction of psychology can not be defended on ontological grounds, the functional characterization of psychological states (as mentioned above) is compatible with a weak form of the identity theory, viz., token physicalism, where the identities do not involve physical natural kinds, but rather the overall states of complex functional systems. If this version of the identity theory is acceptable to the materialists, then the battle over the role of identities in reductions is misplaced, since from token physicalism "it does not follow that the 4Some emphasis added. natural kind predicates of psychology are co-extensive with the natural kind predicates of any other discipline (including physics)." (Fodor 1974 , p. 105) Token physicalism embodies identity claims which, because of the functional characterizations involved, are so nonspecific (at least from a compositional standpoint) that no one would be tempted to initiate a microreduction on the basis of their authority. Causey, however, in his reply to Fodor leaves little doubt as to both his dissatisfaction with this suggestion and his complete confidence in his model's propriety for the microreduction of any theories in psychology. (Causey 1977, pp. 142-58) Many materialists, including Causey, are generally convinced that a thoroughgoing microreduction of psychology can be accomplished.
Causey asserts that the superiority of the stronger versions of the psycho-physical identity theory is guaranteed by the rigorous homogeneity constraints which apply in a uniform microreduction. (This is the cash value of his response to Fodor.) The question, however, is not abetted by reasserting the validity of philosophical legislation. Commenting on identity theorists generally, Wimsatt pinpoints Causey's problem:
They are right in assuming that there must be something more to reduction than undifferentiated stuff-identity, but they are wrong in assuming that this something more is a stronger identity condition, such as property identity. The something more that makes a stuffidentity theory nontrivial is its explanatory import. (1976, p. 225) Considering Hull, Schaffner, and Wimsatt's comments on reduction in genetics, Fodor's on the reduction of psychology, and other's on the various other "classical" cases of reduction,5 Causey's insistence upon uniform microreduction surely deserves reexamination. His model seems to risk being skewered on the second horn of the dilemma. For Causey, though, this may well be a small price to pay for his model to retain its eliminative advantages.
The crucial point is that Causey fails to appreciate just how hypothetical identity attributions generally are in scientific theorizing. Instead of identities being assigned late in the game to those coextensionalities which prove persistently recalcitrant to explanation, they are often proposed relatively early, initiating wholly new lines of research. When in doubt (many scientists) assume the truth of a proposed identity until empirical research clearly indicates otherwise. The postulation of identities is a research tool for extending the explanatory range of theories.6 They are not proposed as the grounds for justifying eliminative moves in microreductions (even if, after the fact, they may be cited as such).
5For an excellent bibliography of the relevant literature, see Wimsatt (1978 These identity statements are genuinely hypothetical.7 The comprehensive identification of all of the various entities' attributes is usually unnecessary, since only a small set of these are pertinent to the immediate explanatory goals of the reduction. The attributes of interest are the causal properties of these entities which are independently specified in the relevant theories. Consequently, though synthetic identities may not require causal explanation themselves, this does not preclude the need for employing causal theories in their justification.8 Causey is quite right to claim that there is no causal explanation for why two entities are identical. He is wrong, however, in concluding from this that we need not attend to causal explanations when justifying why we would hold that certain entities are identical. As Causey recognizes, successful explanations constitute our best source of evidence for such identity claims. (1977, pp. 98-99) But this should not be regarded as some rear guard maneuver carried out after the fact. We posit synthetic identities in order to consider the plausibility of a proposed reductive explanation. Synthetic identity statements cannot deus ex machina certify these explanations.
The ontological economies promised by uniform microreduction can easily distract us from the fundamental explanatory issues. The transitivity of interlevel reductions is the product of the explanatory abilities of the relevant theories and not of the identities which may be postulated as reduction functions, since it is precisely these explanations that ultimately justify those postulations and define their range. Because identities can be hypothesized and because they might facilitate theoretical or ontological simplifications is no reason for holding that these hypotheses are, in fact, true. Those decisions are made on the basis of the explanatory strength of the theories in which they are imbedded and are, therefore, ultimately empirical matters. (Consequently, Causey's reply to Fodor seems a bit doctrinaire.)9
Perhaps this whole discussion has been somewhat misleading, though. Ontological economizing is not really all so central an issue in interlevel reduction. The goal of such intertheoretic research is to increase the explanatory power of science; it is not to decrease the size of our ontologies. Everyone agrees that bridge laws and identity statements have comparable logical muscle in reduction contexts. My point, however, has been that neither have sufficient strength ontologically to legitimize Causey's eliminativism. The identity claims in most (interlevel) reductive explanations are generally quite restricted and go no farther afield than the identification of the causally (read "explanatorily") interesting properties of 70n this point see Nagel (1965) . 8On this point see Maull (1977) . 9In his (1979) Richardson defends the possibility of ontological simplifications in interlevel reductions similar to those that Causey foresees. He does so, however, without making the sorts of in principle assumptions that seem so prevalent in Causey's work. the entities involved. This may not reduce the size of our ontologies very much, but it is quite adequate from the standpoint of explanatory suggestiveness.
